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ANALYSIS
Higher, Larger, Costlier: Sochi and the 2014 Winter Olympics1
Martin Müller, Zurich
Abstract
With its subtropical climate and beaches, Sochi is known as the summer capital of Russia. For its conversion 
into a global winter sports resort, the Russian government has set in motion a gigantic programme of investment. 
With dire consequences: the gigantomaniac project has resulted in a massive waste of money, enormous envi-
ronmental damage and infrastructure grossly out of proportion to the everyday needs of the local population.
Russia’s Summer Capital
Sochi is the beating heart of the Russian Riviera on the 
Black Sea coast. !e agglomeration extends for more 
than 140 km along the coast until the Abkhazian border, 
with a population of just under 420,000. !e city proper 
has a population of only 130,000, however. !e area’s 
topography means that its settlements and infrastructure 
are concentrated on a thin coastal strip, the land rising 
sharply behind it; Mount Fisht, after which the Olym-
pic Stadium is named, rises 2,867 metres a mere 30 km 
from the sea to form the north-western edge of the Cen-
tral Caucasian range. Situated at 44° north, Sochi is at 
a similar latitude to Nice or Genoa. Located in a humid 
subtropical climate zone, it experiences colder tempera-
tures in winter and significantly more precipitation than 
either of these cities however. !e orographic lifts caused 
by the Caucasian wall bring 1,700 mm of precipitation 
annually—falling as snow on the high mountains in 
autumn and winter if the temperature is low enough. 
!e advertising slogan “Where white snow meets the 
Black Sea” is misleading however: the snow seldom lies 
for more than a few days at sea level.
Sochi’s annual average temperature of 13.1°C is 3°C 
higher than Vancouver, which in 2010 became the warm-
est Winter Olympic venue. Palm trees, eucalyptus and 
oleander bear witness to the subtropical climate and 
make Sochi unique among the regions of Russia. !e 
city is traditionally renowned as Russia’s summer capital 
(Letnyaya Stolitsa) and has specialised as a seaside resort. 
In the Soviet Union, Sochi was probably considered the 
most prestigious holiday destination and was a model city 
for Soviet tourism. Many trade unions owned grand san-
atoria there, and a visit (putyovka) to Sochi was a priv-
ilege granted only to the nomenklatura or to workers 
of outstanding merit. During the tenth five-year plan 
(1976–1980) a total of 47 million stayed at the sanatoria.
!e dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 also 
brought a collapse in the number of tourists. With the 
economic upturn since Putin came to power, Russian cit-
1 !is article is a revised version of Müller, Martin. 2013. “Sochi 
and the 2014 Winter Olympics.” Religion & Society 41: 21–23. 
!anks are due to John Heat for the translation and to Stefan 
Kube for the generous approval to reuse this article.
izens increasingly prefer to spend their holidays beyond 
the former Iron Curtain rather than return to the old 
centres of Soviet tourism. More than twenty years after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sochi receives far fewer 
guests than it did during its boom years. Nobody knows 
quite how many fewer. Sochi’s mayor, Anatoly Pakho-
mov, said there were four million summer visitors, which 
would place Sochi up there with such international super-
resorts as Cancún and Atlantic City. On another occa-
sion he said there were only three million. Other sources 
suggest one million is more realistic. !is estimate would 
also tally with the passenger numbers of 2.1 million at the 
airport in Sochi, given that most visitors to Sochi come 
by plane. Moreover, the length of stays has decreased 
significantly: whereas in the past visitors stayed for an 
average of nine days, now it is only five. In sum: tour-
ism in Sochi is now a mere shadow of its former glory.
A Makeover for Winter Sport
Until recently only a few scattered ski lifts near Sochi 
suggested that the topography of the Caucasus also held 
potential for winter tourism. Notwithstanding a few 
small areas such as Dombay in Karachay-Cherkessia or 
on Mount Elbrus, the entire Caucasus is hardly acces-
sible for mass tourism. !e 2014 Winter Games are 
supposed to tap into this potential, with Putin hop-
ing to draw on Sochi’s long tradition as a Soviet resort 
while giving the region a new image. Sochi is meant to 
become Russia’s third city after Moscow and St. Peters-
burg. While Moscow represents the nerve centre of polit-
ical and economic power and St. Petersburg is Russia’s 
cultural capital, the new Sochi looks to the west; noncha-
lant and easy-going, it invites the global leisure industry 
to get to know a Russia beyond oil, gas and corruption. 
!e slogan for the Winter Games in Sochi, “Hot. Cool. 
Yours.” (Zharkie. Zimnie. Tvoi.), targets those seeking 
a hedonistic lifestyle. To support his vision, Vladimir 
Putin attended the IOC meeting in Guatemala in 2007, 
to give his personal guarantee that the organisation 
would run smoothly and extolled Sochi’s virtues for the 
2014 Games. !e immodest yardsticks for the new Sochi 
are the established resorts of the global winter sport jet-
set from Aspen to Zermatt. For Putin there is no doubt: 
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“Sochi is going to become a new world class resort for 
the new Russia. And the whole world!”
Putin’s promise had far-reaching consequences for 
the region. When Sochi was awarded the 2014 Winter 
Olympics on 5 July 2007, there wasn’t a single venue 
capable of hosting an Olympic event. !e area lacked 
tens of thousands of hotel rooms of international stan-
dard. !e region was beset by frequent traffic jams, the 
30-kilometre drive from the airport to central Sochi 
sometimes taking more than two hours during rush 
hour. 12 billion US dollars were set aside for the Games, 
but it soon transpired that this was not nearly sufficient. 
In early 2013 the government published a new estimate 
of some 50 billion dollars. !e 16-day event in Sochi 
now surpassed the hitherto most expensive (and much 
larger) Summer Games held in Peking in 2008 by more 
than 10 billion US dollars. !e event thus represents an 
extreme example of regional politics: investment in the 
region amounts to 115,000 US dollars per inhabitant of 
Sochi. !is means that every Russian citizen foregoes 
an average of 350 US dollars in public funds.
Contrary to the original plan, the larger part of the 
money invested has come from the state purse. Prepa-
rations for the Winter Games were supposed to have 
become a model for the role of private investors in the 
realisation of large-scale projects in Russia. But interest 
on the part of investors has remained low; lucrative con-
tracts were awarded to the camarilla, while numerous 
other projects promised little profit. !e government thus 
overtly called for private investors such as the oligarchs 
Oleg Deripaska and Vladimir Potanin to do their duty 
to society and finance these unprofitable projects. Along 
with the development of resorts, it was also demanded 
that they foot the bill for sports venues, as a kind of indi-
rect tax. After the Winter Olympics, these stadia would 
pass over into state ownership at no cost. !e benefactors 
hoped this implied that in return they would enjoy good 
connections to the authorities and preferential treatment 
when it came to awarding contracts.
!is preferential treatment is evident everywhere. 
Putin’s bosom friend Arkady Rotenberg, for example, 
has built up a portfolio of 3.4 billion US dollars in pub-
lic contracts through his activities. !e mechanisms for 
personal gain are similar. Either unwelcome competitors 
are put under pressure through state-sanctioned intimida-
tion in order to force acquisition of property at favourable 
prices, or the prices of contracts are artificially inflated so 
that every stakeholder is guaranteed a corresponding slice 
of the cake. !ose who fall out of favour have to leave 
the scene. !e Bilalov brothers had to sell their shares in 
the ski area in Gornaya Karusel' in Krasnaya Polyana and 
emigrate to Germany after Akhmed Bilalov had publicly 
criticised Putin several times. In turn, specially appointed 
state inspectors pointed to financial mismanagement and 
inefficiency in Bilalov’s construction projects. !e offi-
cial line, however, is that preparations for the Winter 
Games are free of corruption. In 2011, Vice Premier Dmi-
tri Kozak declared that a large-scale state investigation 
had not brought to light a single case of illegal payments.
A Resort from a Retort
In 2013 Sochi became the world’s largest building site: 
almost 100,000 construction workers worked round the 
clock to complete the resort in time for the arrival of more 
than 120,000 visitors in February 2014. As was the case 
with the Vancouver Games, the Sochi event will be held 
in two clusters: a coastal cluster for the ice sports in Adler 
and a mountain cluster for the alpine sports and sledg-
ing in Krasnaya Polyana. Whereas the buildings on the 
coast are arranged around a central square and thus realise 
a concept of short paths, the facilities in the mountains 
are spread across several resorts along the Mzymta valley 
(see Table 1). !e ski areas in Krasnaya Polyana are all 
equipped with the latest technology, but with the excep-
tion of Roza Khutor they are all rather small. !e old-
est area is Alpika Service, which, like Laura, is owned by 
Gazprom. !e first chair lifts were built here in the early 
1990s, and plans were hatched to bring the Winter Games 
to Sochi. Two attempts in 1991 and 1995 failed due to 
insufficient infrastructure and the instability that charac-
terised Russia, and particularly the Caucasus, in the 1990s.
!e names of the architects and planners for Sochi 
read like a global who’s who of the (winter) sports scene: 
Ecosign from Whistler in Canada helped design the 
bid for the Games, Drees und Sommer from Stuttgart 
are project managers for the Olympic Park, the Popu-
lous architects’ studio designed the Fisht Olympic Sta-
dium, the German engineering firms Gurgel + Partner 
and Kohlbecker designed the bobsleigh run and the ski 
jumps. International chains such as Radisson, Hyatt, 
Swissôtel or Mercure have opened hotels in Sochi and 
its environs. Despite its ambitions to become a player 
in the international market, the best chances for Kras-
naya Polyana seem to lie in the Russian domestic market: 
with prices similar to those in the Alps, only connois-
seurs will be willing to overcome difficulties in obtain-
ing visas and language barriers in order to get to know 
the relatively small ski areas of Krasnaya Polyana.
!e larger part of the projected budget is not for 
sports facilities, however, but for infrastructure, espe-
cially for transport and energy supply. !e largest proj-
ect is a new rail and road link between the airport in 
Adler on the coast and the resort of Alpika Service in 
Krasnaya Polyana, costing between eight and nine bil-
lion US dollars—almost double the entire investments 
in the 2010 Vancouver Games. !e new connection will 
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reduce the time spent travelling the 50 km from Adler 
to Krasnaya Polyana from one hour to around 30 min-
utes at best. !e hotel capacity too is undergoing massive 
expansion. 42,000 hotel rooms in various categories are 
part of the contractual agreement with the IOC—it is 
already foreseeable, however, that not all the hotels will 
be ready on time. For this reason, alternative arrange-
ments have been put in place for some stakeholders: for 
example, the approximately 25,000 volunteers are to be 
housed on chartered cruise ships anchored on the coast.
Excesses and Investment Ruins
!e will to reconstruct Sochi demonstrates a gigantoma-
nia that is unusual even by Russian standards. !e extent 
of the investments puts every other large-scale post-Soviet 
project in the shade. !e consequences are as dire as 
they are predictable. !e enormous pressure of time felt 
in building the necessary infrastructure, often accentu-
ated by arbitrary bureaucratic decisions, means that the 
impact on the environment and people has become a sec-
ondary concern. Even the organising committee concedes 
that irreversible damage has been done. !is is all the 
more serious because the construction sites are located 
in Caucasian nature reserves. For example, extensive sec-
tions of the river Mzymta have been spoilt and straight-
ened, whilst pillars for the rail and road link have been 
cemented into the river bed, from which large amounts of 
gravel have been directly excavated. Meanwhile, environ-
mental organisations have completely withdrawn from 
discussions with contractors after even the most funda-
mental aspects of environmental protection were ignored, 
although the organising committee continues to adver-
tise the event as the greenest Olympic Games of all time.
!e principal legacy of this gigantomania, however, 
will be infrastructure that is utterly disproportional and 
far too expensive for everyday needs. !e combined rail-
road link from Adler to Krasnaya Polyana will not be 
used to capacity even in high season. !e total capac-
ity amounts to 20,000 passengers per hour (11,500 by 
road, 8,500 by rail)—more than the number of rooms 
planned for Krasnaya Polyana. !e subsequent use of 
the six stadia and the winter sport facilities will be the 
biggest cause for concern, however. After the Games, 
ownership of these facilities will pass over to the sports 
ministry, which foresees estimated maintenance costs of 
82 to 137 million US dollars annually. !e idea of dis-
mantling existing stadia in other areas and reconstruct-
ing them in Sochi was claimed to be unviable and will 
only be realised for one stadium.
For this reason, many local residents are unhappy 
despite the inordinate investments for they cannot see 
how the extravagance will be of any use in their every-
day lives. On the contrary, the remaining slivers of prime 
real estate on the Black Sea coast and in the moun-
tains have been sold to foreign investors and will thus 
be reserved for paying guests. For the foreign observer, 
the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi may be a fleeting 
lesson on the excesses of state dirigisme and neo-patri-
monial politics; for the Russian leadership an opportu-
nity to show the country at its modernised best; for the 
athletes and associations the height of sporting compe-
tition. But for local residents they have changed their 
lives immeasurably. Whether that change is for the bet-
ter, the Russian government is yet to show how.
Table 1: Overview of the Four Ski Areas in Krasnaya Polyana
Roza Khutor Gornaya Karusel' Laura Alpika Service
Owner Interros (Vladimir 
Potanin)
Sberbank Gazprom Gazprom
Length of pistes (in km) 72 12 15 25
Highest elevation Roza Pik (2320 m) Black Pyramid (2300 m) 1800 m Aibga (2238 m)
Lifts (under construction) 13 (5) 8 (1) 6 (6) 6 (1)
Capacity (persons/hour) 30 600 11 340 9 800 (5 670)
Day ski pass CHF 46 (RUB 1500) CHF 40 (RUB 1300) CHF 40 (RUB 1300) Currently under recon-
struction
Olympic facilities Alpine skiing, snow-
boarding, freestyle
Ski jump Biathlon, cross-country 
skiing
Bobsleigh
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ANALYSIS
Olimpstroy: Building the Sochi Olympics from Scratch
Robert W. Orttung, Washington, DC
Abstract
!e Sochi Olympics will cost Russia more than $50 billion. With the state corporation Olimpstroy running 
the show, the games provide a useful case study of how well-connected elite insiders benefit from the coun-
try’s current political and economic system.
!e Most Expensive Olympics Ever
!e Sochi Olympics will cost Russia at least $50 bil-
lion, giving them the dubious claim to fame of being 
the most expensive Olympics ever held. Why are they 
so expensive? Who is footing the bill? And who bene-
fits from these expenditures?
!e Sochi Olympics are so expensive because the host 
city was mostly known as a summer tourist destination 
before Russia won the right to host the Winter Olym-
pics in 2007. It was a place where Russians could go to 
relax on the beach. Skiing was an option in the winter, 
but nearby mountains did not boast a major interna-
tional ski resort. In a perverse way, this situation made 
Sochi attractive to the International Olympic Commit-
tee (IOC) members who picked Sochi over competitors 
in Austria and South Korea: nominating Sochi meant 
that Russia would have to build a brand new resort with 
state of the art facilities and amenities.
In 2007, Russia seemed like a good bet for the games. 
President Vladimir Putin strongly endorsed the idea of 
the Olympics and the country was booming economi-
cally thanks to its oil and natural gas exports at a time 
when world energy prices were reaching record highs. 
!e economic picture has since dimmed in the wake of 
the 2008 financial crisis, lower energy prices, and Rus-
sia’s inability to wean its economy away from dependence 
on hydrocarbon exports. However, Putin has remained 
true to his word, meeting the IOC’s expectation to invest 
whatever it takes to prepare for the games.
!ere are four categories of expenses for the Olym-
pics: operating expenses for the 17 days of competition, 
construction of Olympic event facilities, urban infra-
structure necessary to host the influx of athletes, spec-
tators and media for the games, and security. !e vast 
majority of the expenses for the Sochi games are going 
into infrastructure projects designed to turn Sochi into 
a world class city.
!e Source of the Money
Most of the funds for the Olympics come from the Rus-
sian state budget. In Western countries, the organizers 
of mega-events like the Olympics are usually local real 
estate developers, working in close association with local 
politicians, who want to promote the brand of their city, 
improve local amenities, increase tourism, and thereby 
drive up property values. While the federal government 
provides some of the funding for infrastructure devel-
opment and security, local sources are typically respon-
sible for the Olympic budget.
In Russia, it is the federal government that is the driv-
ing force behind the games. Federal politicians and busi-
nesses are making all the key decisions, not their local 
counterparts. Accordingly, the federal state budget is 
providing the vast majority of the funds for the Olympic 
preparations. !is money is going toward extensive new 
infrastructure in terms of railroads, roads, telecommuni-
cations, energy supply, hotels, and new sports facilities.
!e original budget estimate for the games in 2007 
was just $12 billion. At the beginning of 2013, revised 
calculations for the necessary outlays topped $50 billion. 
As the funder of last resort, the state budget is the only 
source capable of providing such large sums.
Other funders include state-owned and controlled com-
panies like Gazprom and Russian Railroads, which both 
hold monopolies in their respective areas. At the direc-
tion of the Kremlin, they also contribute to the expenses.
Putin has also asked key billionaire oligarchs, such 
as Oleg Deripaska and Vladimir Potanin to contribute 
to the effort. In their case, Vneshekonombank (VEB) 
provides loans that can can provide as much as 90 per-
cent of the capital that they need to cover their costs. 
Nevertheless, these oligarchs have complained that the 
Olympics were forcing them to invest in projects that 
had little chance of becoming profitable in the future. As 
they build hotels that will be sufficient for the Olympic 
games themselves, it is not clear that future tourism will 
fill up the vacancies that will be created. Indeed, there 
are already signs of trouble and impending debt defaults. 
Olympic investors like Gazprom, Inter RAO, Renova, 
Interros, Sberbank, and Bazovyi element are asking that 
their loans be restructured, according to a November 
article in Vedomosti. !e companies claimed that they 
were all losing money on their projects and could not 
pay back their loans under current conditions.
Where is the Money Going?
In most countries, an Organizing Committee for the 
Olympic Games (OCOG), which is accountable to the 
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IOC, runs the Olympic games and ensures that all the 
facilities are ready by the time that the Opening Cere-
monies begin. Putin, however, chose to take a different 
approach that fits better with his style of government 
rather than the methods more common in developed 
democracies. In the Russian case, the OCOG serves as 
a façade for the organization that really wields all the 
power. Instead of reporting to the IOC, Putin wanted 
to be sure that he and his colleagues could operate with-
out intrusive oversight. Russia’s construction industry is 
known as one of the most corrupt sectors of the econ-
omy and Russian leaders undoubtedly had no desire to 
make its workings transparent to outsiders.
!e key bureaucratic actor in making sure that the 
Olympic facilities and infrastructure are ready on time 
is Olympstroi, the common name for the organization 
formally known as the State Corporation for the Con-
struction of Olympic Venues and the Development of 
Sochi as a Mountain Resort. Putin created Olimpstroy 
on 30 September 2007, on the basis of a federal law, to 
oversee the design and construction of the sporting ven-
ues, transportation, electricity, tourism, and security 
buildings, organize their functioning, hold tenders, and 
monitor the progress of Olympic construction and the 
performance of related activities. Olimpstroy was never 
mentioned in the documents that Russia provided to the 
IOC as part of its application to host the games and it 
only appeared on the scene after Russia had won its bid.
Olympstroi is one of only seven “state corporations” 
in Russia. !e others are: Rosatom, Russian Technolo-
gies, Rusnano, Vneshekonombank, the Mortgage Lend-
ing Agency, and the Housing and Utilities Reform Fund. 
State corporations are different from private corpora-
tions and state agencies. Formally, they are defined as 
non-profit corporations. !ey are not required to provide 
detailed annual reports even though they have access 
to state funds. !eir special status effectively makes it 
possible to control money with minimal oversight and 
interference. When he was president, Dmitry Medve-
dev criticized the workings of the state corporations 
and tried to hold them to higher levels of accountabil-
ity. However, this process came to an end when Putin 
remarked that state corporations “are neither good nor 
bad. !ey are necessary.”
A study of Olimpstroy spending by Aleksandr Soko-
lov demonstrated that the cost of building a stadium, 
road, or bridge in Russia is much more expensive than 
similar projects in other countries. His examination of 
seven key Olympic sites found that the Russian proj-
ects cost 57.4 per cent more than other projects and 
claimed that the difference in costs had been siphoned 
off by the insiders who controlled the key construc-
tion companies.
While the exact distribution of these rents is unclear, 
some facts are known. Companies such as Mostotrest 
and Stroygazmontazh controlled by Arkady Rotenberg, 
a childhood friend of Putin, have received more than 
$7 billion in contracts for Olympic projects, according 
to a Bloomberg report based on corporate and govern-
ment reports. !ese projects include road construction 
and building the media center. Not surprisingly, most 
Russians think that the state money is being spent inef-
fectively, according to a Levada Center poll conducted 
in June 2013.
Rotenberg’s success in winning such contracts sug-
gests that different categories of businessmen have dif-
ferent relations with the Olympics. Putin’s close friends 
seem to be benefitting from the state’s largess, while 
1990s era oligarchs, like Deripaska and Potanin, are 
expected to contribute to the Olympic pot.
Who is Running Olimpstroy?
!e Russian Government appoints the president of 
Olimpstroy and there has been little stability in the posi-
tion. Since it was created, the corporation saw four pres-
idents: Semyon Vainshtok (2008), Viktor Kolodyazhnyi 
(2008–9), Taimuraz Bolloev (2009–11), and Sergei 
Gaplikov (since 2011). !e rapid turnover of the lead-
ers indicates poor management, the short-term time 
horizons of the groups in charge, and fertile grounds for 
corruption opportunities. By contrast, in organizations 
that apparently have little absolute power, the jobs of 
Alexander Zhukov, the president of the Russian Olym-
pic committee, and Dmitri Chernyshenko, the head of 
OCOG, have been more stable.
Before becoming the inaugural president of Olimp-
stroi, Vainshtok had served as the president of Transneft, 
the Russian oil pipeline monopoly, from 1999 to 2007. 
After Vainshtok stepped down as the head of Transneft, 
crusading anti-corruption blogger Alexey Navalny in 
November 2010 accused that monopoly of misusing $4 
billion in state funds as part of a Siberian pipeline con-
struction project. Following his removal from Olimp-
stroy, Vainshtok eventually moved to London and then 
Israel, where he became chairman of the board of the 
company Israel’s Financial Levers.
!e next president, Kolodyazhnyi, was the previ-
ous mayor of Sochi, known for owning a cement fac-
tory which supplied the city and therefore allegedly pro-
viding a profit for himself at the expense of the public 
purse. His problem at Olimpstroy was that he had lit-
tle power vis-à-vis the Krasnodar Krai Governor Alek-
sandr Tkachev and therefore came under attack from 
the Krai authorities who wanted to gain greater control 
over Olimpstroy than the federal authorities wanted to 
give them.
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Bolloev, the former head of the Baltika brewery in 
St. Petersburg who served as the third president, appar-
ently did not see eye-to-eye with Deputy Prime Minis-
ter Dmitry Kozak during his term.
!e fourth and current president Gaplikov is the for-
mer prime minister of the republic of Chuvashia and 
former deputy chief of staff of the Russian government.
Running Olimpstroy would be a difficult job for any 
manager. On the one hand, the Olympics Opening Cer-
emonies will take place on February 7 so all the facilities 
must be fully functioning at that point. Given the inter-
national media spotlight, everything has to meet high 
levels of quality. Even if the budget is unlimited, there 
is no way to get around the need to produce results on 
time. On the other hand, the head of Olimpstroy sits on 
top of large cash flows, so many groups and individuals 
will be interested in securing contracts that ensure that 
part of the money will run in their direction.
A key reason behind the games is to provide funding 
to key regime elites. Vainshtok, as the former head of 
state-controlled oil pipeline monopoly Transneft, itself 
a major generator of rents for the elite, was well placed to 
continue performing this function. Kolodyazhnyi likely 
performed a similar task. However, their short tenure 
points to the likely existence of conflict among the var-
ious elites seeking to control the money flows and their 
inability to ensure that the Olympic events would be 
ready on time. Bolloev and Gaplikov were likely more 
focused on getting results as well as distributing the rents.
!e leadership chaos in Olimpstroy has apparently 
had an impact on the construction projects. !e Fisht 
Olympic Stadium, the main venue for the games, was 
still not finished in late 2013. One anonymous insider 
who was involved in planning the opening ceremonies 
blamed the problems on Olimpstroi’s rotating leader-
ship, which made it difficult for the organization to 
track the work of all of its subcontractors, according to 
the Moscow Times.
!e one constant in the management of Olimpstroi 
is Dmitry Kozak, currently holding the title of dep-
uty prime minister. Kozak served as the head of the 
Olimpstroy Board of Directors until 2012, when he was 
replaced by Igor Slyunyaev, Russia’s minister for regional 
development, though Kozak still oversees the Olym-
pic project as deputy prime minister. Kozak’s influence 
comes from his informal ties to Putin rather than his 
formal job at any given time. Before appointing him to 
Olimpstroy, Putin had turned to him to address a vari-
ety of complex tasks, including, legal reform, restruc-
turing relations between Moscow and the regions, and 
addressing the problems of the North Caucasus. !e 
various problems in Olimpstroy have apparently not 
diminished Putin’s confidence in Kozak.
Conclusion
In financial terms, the Olympics are a game for Rus-
sia’s elites. !e main beneficiaries seem to be wealthy 
friends of Putin, who receive contracts from Olimp-
stroy to build facilities that may have little use after the 
games. a different group of elites, forced to invest in proj-
ects that are unlikely to be profitable, are complaining 
loudly. !e consequence is likely to be cause for a split 
among the elite dividing those who are benefiting and 
those who are not.
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ANALYSIS
Migrant Workers and the Sochi Olympics
Sufian Zhemukhov, Washington, DC
Abstract
When Sochi was awarded the 2014 Winter Olympics in 2007, the Kremlin proclaimed its intention to use 
this mega-project to create new jobs and attract new migrants to the region in and around Sochi. However, 
the seven year experience of constructing the Olympic infrastructure has not seen this intention effectively 
realized, and has seen a change in approach from the Kremlin, reflecting a generalized increase in xenopho-
bia within Russian society during this period. Both official and unofficial means were used to restrict the 
number of foreign migrant workers, and cases in which both foreign and domestic workers were exploited 
were numerous, culminating in a campaign by the Krasnodar authorities to deport migrant workers before 
the games begun. !e Sochi Olympics, thus, suggest that the Russian authorities remain unable to man-
age both large-scale projects and the sensitive issue of migrant workers, often resorting to solutions based on 
brute force, rather than the coherent implementation of an appropriate legal framework.
In May 2013, less than a year before the start of the 2014 Winter Olympics, a group of Chechen work-
ers organized a demonstration in Sochi against their 
employer, the construction company Izhtransmono-
lit, demanding to be paid their last three-month wage 
arrears and complaining about their poor working con-
ditions and the lack of formal employment contracts. At 
the same time, they argued that they were unable to find 
either legal or better employment elsewhere, because 
of the informal rule imposed by the organizers of the 
Olympics preventing Chechens being hired.1
Such cases are typical of the current problems expe-
rienced by workers at the Olympic site and reflect wider 
socio-political crises within contemporary Russia, which 
include issues such as xenophobia, corruption, human 
rights violations and insecurity. As a result of these prob-
lems and restrictions, the Kremlin’s initial intention to 
use this mega-project to create new jobs and attract new 
migrants to the region in and around Sochi has not been 
realized. !is raises the question: Why did the organiz-
ers of the 2014 Olympics in Sochi fail to establish the 
necessary legal and employment conditions to realize 
these intended goals in constructing and developing this 
mega-project, and what methods, if any, is the Kremlin 
currently using to manage the migrant issue?
Official Russian Policy Towards Migrant 
Workers and the 2014 Olympics
In the period between the submission of its bid to host 
the Winter Olympics and the start of the games, the offi-
cial Russian position towards migrant labor has shifted 
dramatically, against a backdrop of growing xenophobia 
across Russian society. If in 2009, around 52 percent of 
Russians expressed a negative attitude towards foreign 
1 “V Sochi chechenskie rabochie vyshli na stikhiinyi miting pro-
tiv zaderzhek po zarplate”, Rosbalt, 22 May, 2013, <http://www.
rosbalt.ru/federal/2013/05/22/1131437.html>
workers coming to Russia, by 2013 (at the time of the 
deportation of migrant workers from Sochi) this num-
ber had jumped to 78 percent.2 !e Kremlin’s change 
of policy in recent years demonstrates that even when 
it comes to politically vital events, such as the Olym-
pics, the Russian authorities are unable to successfully 
manage the issue of migrant labor.
When Russia submitted its initial bid to hold the 
Olympics, the organizers hoped to improve the coun-
try’s image as the most successful and positive example 
in the post-Soviet region. One of their key stated goals 
was job creation in and around Sochi, and the attrac-
tion of more workers to the region from elsewhere to 
build the Olympic site. Indeed, in 2007, the organizers 
of the Games assured the International Olympic Com-
mittee (IOC) that not only was the security situation in 
the North Caucasus now under control, but that migrant 
workers from elsewhere would be able to seek employ-
ment on the Olympic site.3
Initially, the Games’ organizers did not differen-
tiate between Sochi and the other parts of the North 
Caucasus, either in administrative or in ethnic terms. 
!is, together with the organizers’ pledge to attract 
more foreign and migrant labor, appeared to encour-
age other North Caucasus regions and non-Russian eth-
nicities to see the Sochi Olympic as economically ben-
eficial for the wider region. It was estimated that about 
200,000 migrant laborers would work on the Olympic 
site.4 Changes in legislation were also meant to simplify 
the procedure for employing foreign workers in Sochi. 
2 Levada-Centr, “Pochti 80% rossiyan—protiv pritoka mig-
rantov”, Fontanka, 5 November 2013, <http://www.fontanka.
ru/2013/11/05/047/>
3 Sochi 2014. Candidature File, p. 61, <http://web.archive.org/
web/20100103043040/http://sochi2014.com/sch_question 
naire>
4 “Igor' Naumov. Sochi zastroyat inostrancy. Na vozvedenie 
olimpijskih ob"ektov zazyvayut do 200 tysyach gastarbajterov”, 
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Besides the creation of temporary jobs constructing the 
infrastructure for the Games, the authorities also prom-
ised to create new longer term jobs for Sochi residents 
in the catering and tourist sectors. Indeed, in 2007 the 
deputy head of the Federal Agency for Education, Evg-
eny Butko, announced that, by 2014, 150,000 new jobs 
would be created for Sochi residents.5
However, in practice, the number of legally employed 
workers at the Olympic site was much lower. Accord-
ing to the data provided by “Olympstroi,” only 12,959 
workers from other Russian regions and 7,339 foreign-
ers were working at the Olympic facilities in 2011.6 In 
May 2013, the numbers provided by authorities were 
much higher: out of a total of 80,000 migrant workers 
employed on the Olympic site, 17,000 were said to be 
foreign with the rest from other Russian regions.7 How-
ever, these numbers contrast sharply with those provided 
by the network “Migration and law”, which suggest that 
the numbers are much lower, with no more than 20,000 
migrant workers in 2013.8
Several factors seem to explain the organizers’ inabil-
ity to attract greater numbers of migrant workers. !ese 
include the ongoing security concerns within the region, 
legal wrangling and problems with corruption. !us, 
while in 2007 the organizers could state that “to date, 
there have been no recorded incidents of domestic or 
international terrorist acts in Sochi,”9 this was no lon-
ger the case by 2009. !e emergence of the Caucasus 
Emirate, a terrorist organization operating in the North 
Caucasus region, forced changes in the security strategy 
for the Games in 2009. Unable to stabilize the situation 
in the wider North Caucasus, the Russian authorities 
decided to isolate Sochi from the rest of the North Cau-
casus, particularly in relation to non-ethnically Russian 
populations. To enact an administrative split between 
Sochi and the rest of the increasingly unstable North 
Caucasus, the Kremlin created a new North Caucasus 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 June 2009, <http://www.ng.ru/eco 
nomics/2009-06-18/4_Sochi.html>
5 “V Sochi k 2014 godu budet sozdano 150–160 tys. novyh rab-
ochih mest”, Olimprus, 16 September, 2007, <http://olimprus.
ru/articles/new150workplacetoolimp>
6 Anastasiya Chelok'yan, “Migracionnyj bum po-sochinski”, 
Edinyj Informacionnyj Centr 2014, 5 December 2011, <http://
infocenter2014.ru/events/publications/publications_3712.
html>
7 “V Astrahani prohodit vyezdnoe soveshchanie Sovbeza RF”, 
Astrahanskaya oblast’.RF, 16 May 2013, <http://astrobl.ru/
news/71518>
8 Irina Druzhinina, “Trudovaya migraciya v Sochi: ‘za’ i ‘protiv’”, 
Sochi-express, 31 July, 2013, <http://www.sochi-express.ru/sochi/
news/sochi/7031/>
9 Sochi 2014. Candidature File, p. 29, <http://web.archive.
org /web/2010 01030 430 4 0/ht t p : //so c h i 2014 .c om /
sch_questionnaire>
Federal District, out of the existing South Federal Dis-
trict, in 2010. An unofficial ban was also placed on the 
participation of North Caucasian companies in pub-
lic tenders for construction contracts in the Sochi area. 
Unofficially, the Olympic construction projects were 
also prohibited from employing workers from the eth-
nic Republics in the North Caucasus, a fact that stoked 
even more inter-ethnic tension in the region.10
Workers from abroad also had a hard time obtaining 
permits to come to Sochi, and mostly came by special 
request from the Olympic organizers. A typical case was, 
for example, when the FSB stopped 41 Turkish citizens 
who came to Sochi by boat in July 2007. !ey had tour-
ist visas, but the FSB suspected that they intended to 
work on the Olympic construction sites and denied their 
entry into Russia.11 In May 2009, the Russian and Turk-
ish Prime Ministers, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, officially agreed that Russia would allow Turk-
ish workers to be employed on the Olympic construc-
tion sites in Sochi. In 2009, the Turkish Prime Minis-
ter stated that “the 2014 Olympics expect us and you 
know that Turkish construction companies are among 
leaders in the world market.”12 However, in practice, this 
did not lead to many Turkish migrant workers being 
employed in Sochi. In 2011, only 546 Turkish work-
ers were employed on the Olympic site (see table below).
Table 1: Foreign Workers at the Sochi Facilities in 
201113
Country Workers
Uzbekistan 2,338
Ukraine 886
Belorussia 593
Turkey 546
Bosnia and Herzegovina 541
Moldova 511
Tajikistan 480
Serbia 317
Kyrgyzstan 187
10 Emil Souleimanov, “Security Concerns Ahead Of !e 2014 
Sochi Olympics”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 13, no 7. April 
13, 2011, p.10, <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/
publications/110413analyst.pdf>
11 Aleksandra Anisimova, “Sochinskie pogranichniki ne pustili v 
Rossiyu gruppu nelegalov iz Turcii”, RIA Novosti, 9 July 2007, 
<http://ria.ru/incidents/20070709/68599792.html>
12 Igor' Naumov, “Sochi zastroyat inostrancy. Na vozvedenie 
olimpijskih ob"ektov zazyvayut do 200 tysyach gastarbajterov”, 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 June 2009, <http://www.ng.ru/econom-
ics/2009-06-18/4_Sochi.html>
13 Mariya Sergeeva, “Trudovye migranty iz 29 stran rabotayut na 
olimpijskoj strojke v Sochi”, Sochi1.ru, 20 July 2011, <http://
sochi1.ru/newsline/415974.html>
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Most of the migrant workers in Sochi instead came 
from the former Soviet Republics, mainly from Uzbeki-
stan, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz-
stan. It was much easier for citizens from these states to 
find employment, as they did not need entry visas and 
are permitted to stay in Russia for up to 90 days, dur-
ing which period they sought to find a way through the 
existing red-tape to obtain a work permit.
Violations of the Workers’ Rights
In view of the growing instability in the wider North 
Caucasus region, additional security measures were put 
in place in and around Sochi. !ese measures served to 
encourage a rise in suspicion of, and exploitative and 
corrupt practices towards, the increasingly vulnerable 
group of foreign migrant workers in Sochi. !e increase 
in suspicion occurred in spite of the fact that no for-
eign worker has, as yet, been implicated in any terror-
ist activity. In spite of the creation of additional secu-
rity measures, the safety of foreign workers was far from 
guaranteed. In February 2009, one foreign worker was 
killed and another wounded as a result of a bomb at one 
Olympic facility.14
Foreign migrant workers were further marginalized 
due to their lack of labor rights and poor working con-
ditions. When first arriving at their work place, migrant 
workers were forced to submit their passports and visa 
registration applications to the employer, who promised 
to take care of their registration and provide them with 
a work contract. However, such promises were often not 
kept, as the employers would hold on to these documents 
for weeks if not months, or returned them but without 
the required registration stamps or work contracts.15 In 
2013, Human Rights Watch reported many such cases 
of “employment without contract”; the employers did 
not provide sufficient accommodations for the employ-
ees; the workers did not receive the whole salary or did 
nor receive it in time.16 Such problems persisted across 
the board.
On the Olympic site itself, an unofficial ban was put 
in place on the use of all languages other than Russian, 
which further alienated and marginalized migrant work-
ers. At the construction sites of the Olympic venues in 
Krasnaya Polyana district of Sochi, a sign was displayed 
14 “Urozhenec Chechni osuzhden za podgotovku teraktov v Sochi 
i Anape”, Kavkazskij uzel, 29 September 2009, <http://georgia.
kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/159967/>
15 Maksim Kazakov, “Sochinskaya specoperaciya po vyyavleniyu 
nezakonnyh migrantov”, Sotsialnaia Set Goroda Sochi, 12 Sep-
tember 2013, <http://www.sochi07.com/blogs/203/1792/->
16 “‘H'yuman Rajts Votch’: vlasti prodolzhayut prepyatstvovat' 
rabote pravozashchitnikov na Severnom Kavkaze”, Kavka-
zskij uzel, 22 January 2012, <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/
articles/199683/>
that read “Speak only Russian on the building facilities. 
Fine 100 RUR”17, translated not only into a number of 
foreign languages, such as Uzbek and Kirgiz, but also 
in Circassian, the official language of Adygea Repub-
lic, a region in the South Federal District. !e author-
ities maintained that such measures were necessary to 
clamp down on, and prevent the spread of, any unrest 
and illegality on the construction sites.18
While, in practice, many of these regulations were 
broken, law enforcement agencies also played a part in 
the growing marginalization of foreign workers in and 
around the Olympic sites. If, between 2007 and 2010, 
Russia sought to publicize its measures to liberalize regis-
tration and labor laws in and around Sochi, by the early 
2010s, many of the workers that came to Sochi as a result 
of these liberalized measures had in fact been deported 
or fined. Indeed, in 2011, 154 foreigner workers in Sochi 
were expelled, while others faced a total of 31,727,250 
RUR (more than one million USD) in fines.19 In 2013, 
the authorities registered 24,000 violations of migration 
law and deported 3,000 foreign workers from the Kras-
nodar region, half of them from Sochi.20
In some instances, the authorities even went against 
the organizers of the games, as for example, in the case 
of the Sochi branch of Russia’s Investigative Commit-
tee. In this instance, it was suggested that the state cor-
poration, Olimpstroi, which controlled state funding for 
the Olympics, had embezzled 23 million RUR from 
2007 to 2010 and claimed compensation for employ-
ment contracts that never existed. !is scandal resulted 
in the departure of the head of Olimpstroi, though no 
charges were filed against him personally.21
Local and federal law enforcement agencies did 
not, therefore, stand idly by, they were busy deporting 
and imposing fines on migrant workers and investigat-
ing failures at the highest level of the Olimpstroi man-
agement. However, this did not resolve the situation. 
!e problem was not a lack of information about poor 
working conditions and high levels of corruption in 
and around the construction of this mega-project, but 
17 <http://ncontent.life.ru/media/2/news/2011/08/66414/400.jpg>
18 Irina Desyatnichenko, “Stroitelej Olimpiady shtrafuyut za rod-
noj yazyk”, Life News Online, 11 August 2011, <http://www.life 
news.ru/news/66414>
19 Anastasiya Chelok'yan, “Migracionnyj bum po-sochinski”, 
Edinyj Informacionnyj Centr 2014, 5 December 2011, <http://
infocenter2014.ru/events/publications/publications_3712.
html>
20 “Aleksandr Tkachev potreboval ubrat' iz Sochi vseh nelegalov 
cherez dva mesyaca”, Blogsochi, 9 November, 2013, <http://blog 
sochi.ru/content/aleksandr-tkachev-potreboval-ubrat-iz-sochi-
vsekh-nelegalov-cherez-dva-mesyatsa>
21 Kavkazskij uzel, January 31, 2011.
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the regime’s inability to create a fairer, more transpar-
ent and legal business environment in Sochi.
Deportation of Migrant Workers on the Eve 
of the Olympics
!e ongoing wide-spread violation of workers’ rights all 
pointed to the organizers’ failure to establish effective 
bureaucratic procedures or proper working conditions 
for the construction of the Olympics. And despite crit-
icisms from the highest political levels in Russia about 
the lack of coordination between the different govern-
ment departments involved in the preparations for the 
games, President Medvedev himself did not offer any 
new legal, political, or management measures for solv-
ing these problems. Instead, the Presidential apparatus 
sought to do away with some of the existing bureaucratic 
layers and to move towards more direct presidential con-
trol over the preparations for the Games.22 However, 
the problems caused by inefficient bureaucratic coor-
dination and implementation persisted throughout the 
course of the Olympic construction project, and even as 
late as February 2013, President Putin spoke about the 
need to simplify bureaucratic procedures, whilst call-
ing for greater and more direct political control over 
the mega-project.23
It is hard to image that the Kremlin sanctioned the 
wide-spread corruption and human rights violations 
seen during the run-up to the Olympics. Indeed, with 
the Games approaching, the Kremlin kept an ever closer 
eye over the developments on the ground, with Putin 
remarking that he was busy dealing with Olympic issues 
on a daily basis.24 Apparently this inability to create a 
self-regulating mega-project resulted in the President 
being forced to personally becoming involved in the 
daily running of the project.
Locally, fears were increasingly raised about the 
threat of worker strikes and labor disputes over wage 
arrears during the actual event, as have been seen in 
the run-up to the Games. !e solution from the local 
authorities was rather radical, a mass deportation of 
migrant workers just before the opening ceremony. !e 
governor of the Krasnodar region, Alexander Tkachev, 
stated that “[a]fter finishing the big Olympic construc-
22 “Medvedev raskritikoval chinovnikov za volokitu s olimpijskoj 
strojkoj v Sochi”, Newsru, 23 March 2009, <http://www.newsru.
com/russia/23mar2009/medvedso4i.html>
23 “Vladimir Putin potreboval usilit' kontrol' za rashodovaniem 
sredstv na stroitel'stvo olimpijskih ob"ektov v Sochi”, Federaciya 
gornolyzhnogo sporta i snouborda Rossii, 6 February 2013, <http://
www.fgssr.ru/Sport/ui/Page/Organisation/OrganisationPage 
NewsItem.aspx?id=4276&o=4355&so=3275&fp=3>
24 “‘Vyhodnyh ne byvaet’: Putin prinyal v Sochi vpechatlennogo 
stroitel'stvom Yanukovicha”, Newsru, 26 May 2013, <http://
www.newsru.com/russia/26may2013/sochi.html>
tion in Sochi, the migrants should leave the region.”25 
!e authorities recommended to the 44 largest-employ-
ers in Sochi that they should not pay workers’ salaries 
until the migrants had purchased their return tickets 
home. !is method was, however, obviously ineffective 
for those that had been employed illegally on some of 
the construction sites.
Realizing that they were unable to resolve this issue 
legally, the authorities decided to deport en masse all of 
the migrant workers in Sochi and the Krasnodar Region. 
!e scale of the deportation was akin to a Stalinist mea-
sure. Sixty “raid brigades” were established to search 
and deport “hundreds of thousands migrant workers 
illegally living and working” in Sochi and the Kras-
nodar Region.26 Raids began immediately following 
the September 3 speech by the governor of Krasnodar 
Region in which he called for “raid brigades” consisting 
of the police, the Migration Service, the Federal Secu-
rity Service, and other officials, as well as Cossacks, to 
go through Sochi’s streets to “clean them up.” Deten-
tions continued during the IOC’s final inspection visit to 
Sochi in late September. According to a Human Rights 
Watch report, local authorities had also raided work-
places, homes, and public places, rounding up both 
foreign and migrant workers from elsewhere in Rus-
sia and holding them in police station courtyards and 
overcrowded temporary holding cells. In some cases, 
these detainees were denied access to a lawyer, whilst 
police officers denied that these workers were being held 
in custody. Many of them were subsequently expelled 
from Russia, following court hearings, without law-
yers present.
However, in spite of the adoption of this deportation 
strategy, the Russian authorities were unable to resolve 
the migrant issue. After month-long raids, the governor 
of Krasnodar region stated that 60,000 illegal migrants 
had melted into the local population and disappeared 
from the official radar. !is did not, however, deter the 
authorities from doubling their efforts and continuing 
their policy of deportations.27
25 “HRW: Rossijskie vlasti vysylayut trudovyh migrantov iz 
Sochi”, Grani, 3 October 2013, <http://grani.ru/Politics/Rus 
sia/Regions/m.219692.html>
26 “Administraciya: potok migrantov v Krasnodarskij kraj zashka-
livaet”, Sochi-2014, 25 July 2013, <http://sochi-24.ru/obshestvo/
administraciya-potok-migrantov-v-krasnodarskij-kraj-zashkali 
vaet.2013725.65871.html>
27 “Tkachev: pochti 60 tysyach nelegal'nyh migrantov ‘rastvo-
rilis'’”, Sochi-24, 24 October 2013, <http://sochi-24.ru/poli 
tika/tkachev-okolo-60-tysyach-nelegalnyh-migrantov-rastvor 
ilis.20131024.69681.html>
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Conclusion
!e problems relating to migrant workers in Sochi 
play out on many levels. Firstly, it reflects a general-
ized increase in xenophobia across Russia, whereby in 
2013, 74 percent of Russians expressed negative atti-
tude against foreign workers migrating to Russia. Sec-
ondly, the Kremlin’s inability to resolve the migrant issue, 
even within this tightly controlled state-led mega-project, 
raises doubts about the prospects of them resolving this 
problem across the rest of the country. !irdly, the con-
trast between the regime’s good intentions of attracting 
as many migrant workers as possible at the beginning 
of this mega-project, and the recent mass deportations 
of migrant workers suggests that the regime continues 
to engage in projects it cannot adequately control and 
for which it cannot establish an adequate legal frame-
work. Finally, rather than addressing employment and 
migration issues in a peaceful and competent manner, 
the Russian authorities continue to rely on brute force 
to resolve such problems. !e story of the Sochi Olym-
pic mega-project makes it clear that the current regime 
is unable to tackle sensitive issues in a timely, effective 
and comprehensive fashion, using substantive legal, eco-
nomic, and political means.
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OPINION POLL
“!e Most Expensive Games, Ever”: Russian Opinions on Sochi
Figure 1: Are You Going to Watch the Winter Olympic Games on Television?
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Sochi 2014 extensively 
from time to time, some 
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will limit myself to the 
overviews in the TV news 
I am not interested at all in 
the games 
don't know/no answer 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, January 1998 to 24–27 January 2014,  
<http://www.levada.ru/print/05-02-2014/zimnie-olimpiiskie-igry-v-sochi-interes-nadezhdy-i-otsenka>
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 143, 9 February 2014 13
Figure 2: What, In Your Opinion, Is the Main Reason Russian Bureaucrats Wanted the Winter Olympic Games 
to Be Awarded to Sochi?
It is a good opportunity 
to appropriate and 
"shave off" a huge sum 
from the state budget 
38 
It is honorable and 
important for a big 
country, it aids the 
development of Russian 
sports and rallies the 
nation 
23 
It improves the image of 
Vladimir Putin and the 
leadership of the 
country 
17 
It is a great help for the 
development of the 
health resort Sochi and a 
means of attracting 
tourists to Sochi 
15 
don't know/no answer 
7 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 24–27 January 2014,  
<http://www.levada.ru/print/05-02-2014/zimnie-olimpiiskie-igry-v-sochi-interes-nadezhdy-i-otsenka>
Figure 3: What Is, In Your Opinion, the Explanation for the Fact !at Russia  Spent More on the Preparations 
for the Olympic Games !an Any Other Country?
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greed and dishonesty of the companies responsible for 
construction 
bad management by the state of large-scale federal projects 
difficulties of building modern sports complexes in the Sochi 
area 
low quality of management and construction in Russia 
every year the program of the Games becomes more extensive 
and demands on the quality of sports venues increase 
don't know/no answer 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 24–27 January 2014,  
<http://www.levada.ru/print/05-02-2014/zimnie-olimpiiskie-igry-v-sochi-interes-nadezhdy-i-otsenka>
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Figure 4: What Do You !ink, Will the Bureaucrats and Businessmen Who Are Responsible for Abuses Be 
Called to Account?
definitely yes 
7 
probably 
15 
probably not 
37 
definitely not 
25 
don't know/no answer 
16 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 24–27 January 2014,  
<http://www.levada.ru/print/05-02-2014/zimnie-olimpiiskie-igry-v-sochi-interes-nadezhdy-i-otsenka>
Figure 5: Do You !ink that Russia Did the Right !ing in Applying to Host the Olympic Games in Sochi?
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15 
probably 
38 
probably not 
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definitely not 
8 
don't know/no answer 
21 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 24–27 January 2014,  
<http://www.levada.ru/print/05-02-2014/zimnie-olimpiiskie-igry-v-sochi-interes-nadezhdy-i-otsenka>
Figure 6: Are the Funds Allocated from the State Budget for the Olympic Games in Sochi Being Spent Effectively?
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20 
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35 completely ineffectively 
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19 
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13 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 6–10 June 2013,  
<http://www.levada.ru/print/27-06-2013/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-ob-izderzhkakh-olimpiady>
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Figure 7: Will the Funds Which Russia Invests for “Image Projects” Such as the Olympic Winter Games in 
Sochi 2014 and the Soccer World Championship 2018 Pay Off?
definitely yes 
11 
probably 
32 
probably not 
29 
definitely not 
17 
don't know/no answer 
12 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 6–10 June 2013,  
<http://www.levada.ru/print/27-06-2013/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-ob-izderzhkakh-olimpiady>
Figure 8: Should Russia Spend Large Amounts on “Image Projects” Such as the Olympic Winter Games in 
Sochi 2014 and the Soccer World Championship 2018?
definitely yes 
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probably 
31 
probably not 
29 
definitely not 
15 
don't know/no answer 
12 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 6–10 June 2013,  
<http://www.levada.ru/print/27-06-2013/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-ob-izderzhkakh-olimpiady>
Figure 9: Do Preparations for the Olympic Winter Games 2014 in Sochi Affect the Economic Development of 
Russia? If Yes, How?
They have no effect 
7.2 
positively 
35.6 
negatively 
40.3 
no answer/don't know 
16.9 
Source: representative opinion polls by Fond Obshchestvennogo Mneniya, 12–13 October 2013, <http://fom.ru/obshchestvo/11159>
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Figure 10: Are Investments For the Olympic Wintergames 2014 More !an Sufficient, Insufficient, or Sufficient?
more than sufficient 
62.4 
sufficient 
20.2 
insufficient 
0.9 
don't know/no answer 
16.5 
Source: representative opinion polls by Fond Obshchestvennogo Mneniya, 12–13 October 2013, <http://fom.ru/obshchestvo/11159>
Figure 11: Could the Following Events Occur During the Olympic Winter Games in Sochi?
25 
16 
13 
12 
37 
18 
terrorist attacks 
boycott of the Olympic Games 
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nothing will happen 
no answer/don't know 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 25–28 October 2013,  
<http://www.levada.ru/print/26-11-2013/vozmozhnye-sobytiya-na-zimnei-olimpiade-v-sochi>
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!e Costs of the Olympic Games in Sochi in Comparison
Table 1: Costs and Cost Overruns of Olympic Games 1988 – 2014
Year Games City Country Costs of Olympic Games  
in bln. US$ (2012)
Source
planned 
costs
actual 
costs
cost over-
runs (%)
1988 XV Winter Games Calgary Canada 0.67 1.07 +59.0% [1]
1992 XVI Winter Games Albertville France 0.86 2.03 +135.0% [1]
1992 XXV Summer Games Barcelona Spain 0.69 2.93 +325.0% [3]
1994 XVII Winter Games Lillehammer Norway 0.54 2.03 +277.0% [1]
1996 XXVI Summer Games Atlanta USA 1.64 4.05 +147.0% [1]
1998 XVIII Winter Games Nagano Japan 1.57 2.45 +56.0% [1],[9]
2000 XXVII Summer Games Sidney Australia 2.36 4.48 +90.0% [1],[3]
2002 XIX Winter Games Salt Lake City USA 1.90 2.45 +29.0% [1],[2]
2004 XXVIII Summer Games Athens Greece 2.00 3.20 +60.0% [1]
Costs of Olympic Games 1988 – 2004 4.65 13.50 +190% [3]
2006 XX Winter Games Turin Italy 2.40 4.37 +82.0% [1],[5]
2008 XXIX Summer Games Peking China 5.64 5.86 +4.0% [1]
Costs of Olympic Games 1988 – 2008 16.30 43.19 +165% [3]
2010 XXI Winter Games Vancouver Canada 2.10 2.45 +17.0% [1]
Costs of Olympic Games 1988 – 2010 2.88 6.08 +111% [6],[7]
2012 XXX Summer Games London UK 3.93 15.39 +290.0% [1],[3]
Costs of Olympic Games 1988 – 2012 on average 2.02 4.06 +120.8%  
Olympic Summer Games 1988 – 2012 on average 2.71 5.98 +152.7%  
Olympic Winter Games 1988 – 2012 on average 1.43 2.41 +93.6%  
2014 XXII Winter Games Sochi Russia 5.14 *8.60 +67.5% [8],[11]
Total costs of Sochi-2014 (estimate)  **50.0 +972.0% [13]
Notes: * according to 2009 data ** estimate
Sources: [1] Flyvbjerg B.. Stewart A. (2012): Olympic Proportions: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Olympics 1960–2012. in: Saïd Busi-
ness School Working Papers. Oxford: University of Oxford. June 2012; [2] Olympic Games cost overruns. in: No Games. February 2009. 
<http://nogames.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/costoverruns.pdf>; [3] Jennings W. (2012): Mega-Events and Risk Colonisation. Risk 
Management and the Olympics. in: CARR. March 2012. <http://soton.academia.edu/WillJennings/Papers/248726/Mega-Events_
and_Ris...>; [4] Nowoshenina O.. Ivanova M.. Meremiskaya E. (2007): Sochi – mesto ne dlya otdyha. In: Gazeta.ru. 5 July 2007. 
<http://sport.gazeta.ru/sport/2007/07/a_1880984.shtml>; [5] Wilkinson T. (2006): Turin Hopes Its Pricey Olympic Makeover Lasts. 
in: Los Angeles Times. 5 February 2006. <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/05/world/fg-turin5>; [6] Wilson B. (2010): Will Van-
couver count cost of Olympics? In: BBC News. 12 February 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/bus iness/8510177.stm>; [7] 2010 
Games in Crisis. in: !e Vancouver Sun. 27 September 2006 <http://www.canada.com/vancouver sun/news/story.html?id=01fc5dbe-
9e38-4573...>; [8] Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva RF ot 8.6.2006 No. 357 “O Federalnoy celevoy programme ‘Rasvitie g. Sochi kak gor-
noklimaticheskogo kurorta (2006–2014 gody)’”, <http://www.zakonprost.ru/content/base/part/487742>; [9] Solberg H. (2010): 
Why major sports events end up more expensive than first planned. Sør-Trøndelag College University. Norway. <http://www.idrett.no/
tema/internasjonalt/Documents/idrettsarr.dyrere.pdf>; [10] Taylor A. Blackstone S. 12 Enduring Legacies Of Olympic Host Cities. 
in: Business Insider. 5 July 2012. <http://www.busi nessinsider.com/the-lasting-legacy-of-the-olympics-2012-6...>; [11] Minregion 
ocenil rashody na Olimpiadu v Sochi v 1 trln rubley. In: Vsglyad. 29 September 2009. <http://www.vz.ru/news/2009/9/29/332019.
html>; [12] Samofalova O. (2013): Rossiya vydelilas. In: Vsglyad. 1 February 2013. <http://www.vz.ru/economy/2013/2/1/618531.
html>; [13] Sochi the most extravagant Winter Olympics ever, Deutsche Welle, 6 February 2014, <http://www.dw.de/sochi-the-most-
extravagant-winter-olympics-ever/a-17411857>
Original calculation: Alexander Sokolov (2012): Zatraty na olimpiadu Sochi-2014 rekordnye za v'syu istoriyu Olimpiyskih igr, 16 Au-
gust 2012, <http://igpr.ru/articles/zatraty_na_olimpiadu_v_sochi>.
DOCUMENTATION
Any opinions expressed in Russian Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors. 
Reprint possible with permission by the editors.
Editors: Stephen Aris, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder,, Aglaya Snetkov
Layout: Cengiz Kibaroglu, Matthias Neumann, Michael Clemens
ISSN 1863-0421 © 2014 by Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zürich
Research Centre for East European Studies • Publications Department • Klagenfurter Str. 3 • 28359 Bremen •Germany
Phone: +49 421-218-69600 • Telefax: +49 421-218-69607 • e-mail: fsopr@uni-bremen.de • Internet: <www.css.ethz.ch/rad>
Editors: Stephen Aris, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder, Aglaya Snetkov
!e Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungs-
stelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (<www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de>), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Fed-
eral Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), the Resource Security Institute, the Institute of History at the University of Zurich (<http://
www.hist.uzh.ch/>) and the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at !e George Washington University. It is supported by the 
German Association for East European Studies (DGO). !e Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russland-Analysen (<www.
laender-analysen.de/russland>), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (<www.css.ethz.ch/rad>), and the Russian Regional Report. 
!e Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia’s role in inter-
national relations. 
To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Russian Analytical Digest, please visit our web page at <www.css.ethz.ch/rad>
Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen
Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to the 
interdisciplinary analysis of socialist and post-socialist developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. !e major focus is on the 
role of dissent, opposition and civil society in their historic, political, sociological and cultural dimensions.
With a unique archive on dissident culture under socialism and with an extensive collection of publications on Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Research Centre regularly hosts visiting scholars from all over the world.
One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. !is includes regular e-mail news-
letters covering current developments in Central and Eastern Europe.
!e Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich
!e Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and infor-
mation services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. !e CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the gener-
al public. !e CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. !e Center‘s research focus is on new risks, 
European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, area studies, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.
In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) in public policy degree course for prospective 
professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International 
Studies (MACIS); offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students; and has the 
lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. 
!e program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, 
and the armed forces.
!e CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Crisis and Risk 
Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the 
Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.
!e Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, !e Elliott School of International Affairs, !e George Washington University
!e Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies is home to a Master‘s program in European and Eurasian Studies, faculty members 
from political science, history, economics, sociology, anthropology, language and literature, and other fields, visiting scholars from around the 
world, research associates, graduate student fellows, and a rich assortment of brown bag lunches, seminars, public lectures, and conferences.
!e Institute of History at the University of Zurich
!e University of Zurich, founded in 1833, is one of the leading research universities in Europe and offers the widest range of study courses in 
Switzerland. With some 24,000 students and 1,900 graduates every year, Zurich is also Switzerland’s largest university. Within the Faculty of 
Arts, the Institute of History consists of currently 17 professors and employs around a 100 researchers, teaching assistants and administrative 
staff. Research and teaching relate to the period from late antiquity to contemporary history. !e Institute offers its 2,600 students a Bachelor’s 
and Master’s Degree in general history and various specialized subjects, including a comprehensive Master’s Program in Eastern European His-
tory. Since 2009, the Institute also offers a structured PhD-program. For further information, visit at <http://www.hist.uzh.ch/>
Resource Security Institute
!e Resource Security Institute (RSI) is a non-profit organization devoted to improving understanding about global energy security, particularly 
as it relates to Eurasia. We do this through collaborating on the publication of electronic newsletters, articles, books and public presentations. 
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 143, 9 February 2014 18
ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST
